

#### **15. Salzburger Telekom-Forum** 26. August 2014

## **Breitbandregulierung in Europa**

Stefan Kramer Regulatory Coordination & Markets Unit Communications Networks, Content & Technology DG

The views expressed in this presentation are purely those of the author and may not in any circumstances be regarded as stating an official position of the European Commission



# Outline

- The Article 7 FD mechanism and harmonization measures under Art. 19 FD
- NGA Recommendation (Sep 2010)
  - Objectives, principles and implementation
- Recommendation on non-discrimination and costing methodologies (Sep 2013)
  - Objectives, principles and implementation
- Relevant Markets Recommendation (Oct 2014)
  - Principal changes, implications





# Economic regulation in the EU Regulatory framework – a recap

National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) of the European Union must conduct market analyses to review if specific markets are competitive.

## For markets that:

- (i) meet specific criteria; and
- (ii) are not effectively competitive

NRAs can impose remedies on the operator that has significant market power (ability to behave independently of competitors, customers and consumers).



Commission

## **State of regulation Aug 2014**





	2007 RECOMMENDATION								2003 RECOMMENDATION								
	Access to PSTN for res & non- res.	Call orig. on fixed network	Call term. on fixed network		Broadb. access	Term. segments LL	Voice call term. on mobile networks	Local/nat. call for res.	Internat. call for res.	Local/nat. call for non-res.	Internat. call for non-res.	Retail LL		Trunk segments LL	Access & call orig. on mobile network	Broadcast Transmis.	
	Market 1	Market 2	Market 3	Market 4	Market 5	Market 6	Market 7	ex-Mkt 3	ex-Mkt 4	ex-Mkt 5	ex-Mkt 6	ex-Mkt 7	ex-Mkt 10	ex-Mkt 14	ex-Mkt 15	ex-Mkt 18	
Austria	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	3	2	4	3	4	1	2	1	3	
Belgium	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	w	
Bulgaria	1	2	3	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1			
Croatia		1	1		1	1	1					1		1			
Cyprus	2	2	2	3	3	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	
Czech Republic	3	3	3	2	2	2	3	2	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	2	
Denmark	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	
Estonia	3	3	2	3	3	2	з	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	
Finland	2	3	2	3	3	1	1	2	1	2	1	2	2	1	v	2	
France	3	3	3	4	4	2	3	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	w	3	
Germany	3	2	3	3	2	1	4	2	1	2	1	2	2	1	1	2	
Greece	2	2	3	3	3	2	3	3	1	3	1	2	3	2	1	1	
Hungary	4	3	3	3	3	3	4	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	2	2	
Ireland	2	2	3	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	
Italy	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	
Latvia	1	2	3	3	3	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	1	1	1	
Lithuania	1	1	3	2	2	1	3	3	2	3	2	1	1	1	1	4	
Luxemburg	1	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1		
Malta	2	2	3	2	2	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	
Netherlands	3	2	4	3	3	3	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	
Poland	2	2	2	2	2	1	3	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	2	
Portugal	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2		1	
Romania	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1		2			1	
Slovakia	3	з	3	2	2	2	з	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	
Slovenia	3	2		3	3	2	5	2	1	1	1	2	3	1	3	2	
Spain	3	2		2	2	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	1	3	
Sweden	2	2	3	2	2	2	3	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	3	
uk	4	3	3	2	3	4	3	2	2	2	2	3	2	3	1	1	



# **Commission intervention tools**

- Notification of national draft measures under Articel 7 FD - Commission can intervene
- Comments
  - NRAs to take utmost account
- Phase II investigation
  - **\* Art.7 Framework Directive**
  - \* Art.7a Framework Directive (from May 2011)
- Veto (market definition + SMP finding)
- Art.7a Recommendation (from May 2011) on remedies



# **Art. 19 Framework Directive**

- Harmonised application of EU regulation
  Promote a consistent implementation of remedies
- European Commission can issue a Recommendation or a Decision if implementation of framework across the EU presents divergences that may create a barrier to the internal market.
- National regulators must take "utmost account" of the Commission's recommendations when imposing remedies.



# NGA Recommendation (2010) (1)

Continued availability of wholesale access products

- Terminating segments (in-house wiring)
- Unbundled fibre loops (ODF and/or cabinet)
- Fibre-based WBA
- Relaxation of access regulation
  - Infrastructure competition (Recommend 22) diff. remedies
    - Several alternative infrastructures (FttXs, cable)
    - Competitive access offers + ancillary services (backhaul)
    - Likely to result in effective retail competition
  - Co-investment agreements (Recommend 28) no SMP
    - Joint deployment of multiple FttH lines in specific areas,
    - Equivalent and cost-oriented access to shared infrastructure
    - Effective downstream competition (bitstream, retail)



# NGA Recommendation (2)

- Cost-orientation as matter of principle
  - Ensuring service-based competition
  - Consistency in ducts, copper LLU and fibre access pricing

## Rewarding risks

- Sunk costs, uncertainty on the demand and on technological evolution
- Risk premium (FttH rollout)
- Pricing flexibility when justified
  - Price differentiation (long-term v. short-term contracts)
  - Volume discounts
  - Retail minus for bitstream when sufficient competitive constraints + margin squeeze test



## SMP and product/geographic submarkets

- SMP in market 4 in all MS
- No SMP in market 5 (RO, MT), residential BB (AT), low quality WBA (NL), subnational markets (PT, UK, PL, FI)
- CZ-2013-1322 (market 5) insufficient indirect constraints from cable and WiFi to warrant no SMP finding in geographic submarket - veto
- PL/2014/1632 (market 5) no SMP in cable/LLU areas based on distinct cumulative criteria (per commune) – *comments*
  - Retail market share <40%
  - at least three operators provide retail broadband access to which at least 65 % of premises have access (e.g. cable + LLU)
  - no more than 10 % of premises in a given communal area have no access to the Internet.
- Limited geographic remedy differentiation (FR)
- Emergence of duopolistic market structures in submarkets



# **Access to civil engineering**

- Mandated duct access (AT, BE, DK, EE, FR, DE, EL, PT, HU, IT, PO, SI, ES, HR, LT, SK, UK, BG, LV,MT),
  - sometimes limited to certain network segments
  - Mostly part of market 4, often ancilliary
- No duct access (CZ, FI, RO, SE)
  - Few ducts (NL, BE) but dark fibre
  - no demand (FI, SE but extensive backhaul remedy, RO)



# Access to terminating segments

- Explicitly mandated as part of SMP obligations in about 1/3 of Member States
- Mandated as part of symmetric obligations in FR, PT, HR, IT, ES (FttH)
- Access points sometimes not determined or limited to in-building wiring



# **Access to FttH**

- ODF unbundling mandated in an increasing number of MS (HR, FI, HU, LT, DE, NL, PL (conditional on duct space), SI, SE, SK, MT, AT, DK, EL, IT
  - But: forward looking and limited to PtP
- Not imposed (CZ, FR, PT, RO, UK), not included in market 4 (BE, ES)
  - Delays in market reviews, different network characteristics
- Virtual unbundling in market 4 (UK, AT, DK)
  - Same characteristics as physical unbundling
  - Transitory period towards WDM
  - Altnets often rely on market 5 remedies, varying characteristics of 'enhanced bitstream' (interconnection, QoS, speed/symmetry, multicast, price control)
- Symmetric access regime (FR/2014/1603)
  - Access to in-building wiring, co-investment scheme (multi-fibre), third party (cable und municipal) bitstream offers likely to result in retail competition, but no LLU or bitstream over fibre





### **Access in case of FttN**

- Mandated in majority of MS
- Typically cabinet unbundling
- Vectoring and sub-loop unbundling
  - Presently not compatible
  - (BE/2011/1227)
    - Withdrawal of SLU for Vectoring
    - Re-imposition of SLU still possible
  - (DE/2013/1484)
    - altnets can exercise grandfather rights (e.g. if they offer bitstream to third parties, and cable is not strong in specific area)
    - May allow altnets to gain critical mass for SLU in certain areas (control of 100% of street cabinets)





## **Pricing principles**

- Large majority of MS uses cost orientation, some retail minus (more important in market 5), or price caps.
- Around 2/3 of MS use CCA, 1/3 HCA
- 1/2 LRIC, 1/2 FDC (market 4); 1/3 LRIC, 2/3 FDC (market 5)
- SK/2011/1262 no price control for fibre loop *withdrawn*
- FI/2012/1328-1329 (mkts 4, 5) non-imposition of price control for copper and fibre bitstream – *Commission Recommendation (Art. 7a FD)*
- CZ-2013-1509 (market 5) no price control absent competition safeguards – *withdrawn*



# Recommendation on non-discrimination and costing methodologies

- Surest way to non-discrimination is Equivalence of Input (EoI)
- Stable and consistent wholesale copper access prices in Europe in the transition to NGA
  - Recommended costing methodology by end 2016
    - BU-LRIC+ estimating current cost of modern efficient NGA
    - Different valuation for reusable civil engineering
    - ♦ Cost adjustment (FttX  $\rightarrow$  copper) or overlay network (copper & FttX)
- ✤ No price regulation on NGA networks in presence of
  - EOI, technical and economic replicability, plus competition safeguards (copper anchor *or* alternative infrastructures)



# Implementation – Art. 7a Recommendations

- AT/2013/1475-1476 LLU and WBA prices (margin squeeze test with prices below cost-oriented level)
- EE/2013/1453-1454 LLU and WBA prices (HCA)
- IT/2013/1489-1490 LLU and WBA prices (WACC)
- ES/2013/1466 WBA prices (mark-up)





## Article 7a Recommendations since May 2011

DE/2013/1527 Market 7	Original approach maintained
IT/2013/1489 Market 4	Approach adapted
IT/2013/1490 Market 5	Approach adapted
AT/2013/1475 Market 5	Original approach maintained
AT/2013/1476 Market 4	Original approach maintained
ES/2013/1466 Market 5	Approach adapted
DE/2013/1460 Market 3	Original approach maintained
EE/2013/1453 Market 4	Original approach maintained
EE/2013/1454 Market 5	Original approach maintained
DE/2013/1430 Market 3	Original approach maintained
DE/2013/1424 Market 7	Original approach maintained
FI/2012/1328 Market 4	Approach adapted
FI/2012/1329 Market 5	Approach adapted
PL/2012/1311 Market 5	Approach adapted
NL/2012/1284 Market 3	Original approach maintained
NL/2012/1285 Market 7	Original approach maintained



# The 2014 Recommendation on relevant markets as proposed to COCOM

- 1. Wholesale call termination on individual public telephone networks provided at a fixed location *(current Market 3)*
- 2. Wholesale voice call termination on individual mobile networks *(current Market 7)*
- 3. a) Wholesale local access provided at a fixed location *(current Market 4)*

b) Wholesale central access provided at a fixed location for mass-market products (mainly current Market 5)

4. Wholesale high-quality access provided at a fixed location (mainly current Market 6)



# How to delineate broadband markets? (1)

#### i. Local access

- Comparable to current Market 4, but includes certain virtual unbundling solutions
- Localness, Generic and uncontended, allows for sufficient control
- No preference for virtual unbundling

#### ii. Central access (for mass market services)

- Comparable to current Market 5 but without certain high-end/high quality access products
- Best-effort QoS
- Access seekers have limited control / possibility to differentiate



# How to delineate broadband markets? (2)

#### *iii.* Wholesale high-quality access market at a fixed location

- Focus on service/product characteristics (rather than specific technologies)
  - Low/zero contention
  - Appropriately high upload speeds (or even symmetrical up- and download speeds)
  - Guaranteed availability
  - High QoS (SLAs, 24/7 support, repair)
  - Handover points defined according to density and distribution of business users
- Result: product market likely to include (new) products beyond traditional terminating segments of Leased Lines
- However, presumption that trunk/core elements are replicable remains valid



# Conclusions

- Important differences in speed and technology of NGA deployment remain and also determine choice of regulatory approach
- (Fibre) LLU and duct access become widespread, variations in backhaul and permitted use of ducts
  - Significance in practice, uncertainties over roll-out ('fibre to the IP')
- Due to NGA technology (GPON, vectoring) and scale economies importance of virtual solutions
  - Which market?
  - Varying technical specifications (VULA, 'enhanced bitstream')
- Emphasis on consistent pricing (and costing methods)
- Deregulation in regional markets important in market 5 (no SMP)
  - Differentiation into mass market and high quality market matters for business users



# Thank you for your attention!

# **Questions?**